За кулисами Pусско-турецкой войны 1828 - 1...
andy4675
12.03 2025
THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY
OF
BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY
1783-1919
EDITED BY
SIR A. W. WARD, LiTT.D., F.B.A.
AND
G. P. GOOCH, M.A., LiTT.D.
VOLUME II
1815-1866
CAMBRIDGE
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
1923
Sir Robert Gordon, Stratford's successor, reached Constantinople
in June, and found the Porte resolved to refuse to accept the July
Treaty of 1827, unless conditions were attached to it sufficient to
nullify the effects of the Conference of Poros. On September 19th
the French, Russian and British Plenipotentiaries met in London toreceive the Turkish answer. The British Plenipotentiary sought in
vain to get rid of the Protocol of Poros, France and Russia insisting,
and being in a position to enforce their demands. Eventually all
agreed on the Protocol.
In point of fact, events, as has often been the case in the Balkans,
took all power out of the hands of those not actively engaged in the
struggle. Russia's progress had been chequered in 1828 and in the
early part of 1829. -^^^j ^^ June, General Diebitsch captured Silistria;
in July, he crossed the Balkans with a small force and advanced on
Adrianople. His coming struck terror into all Turkish hearts, and
resistance, in both a military and diplomatic sense, was at an end.
Russia presented the Protocol of Poros as an ultimatum to the Turks.
The Porte, at last awakened, hastened to accept in full the Treaty of
London of July, 1827. Austria and Prussia, who had previously
supported the Porte in its resistance, now at last counselled it to
give way. Diebitsch, though with a sickly army, showed a bold front
and dictated peace like a conqueror at Adrianople on September 14th.
The sword had once more cut the knot.
The Treaty of Adrianople marked the culmination of Russian policy.
Russia had actually achieved what Canning had always attempted to
prevent her from accomplishing. She had acted alone ; she had declared
war on Turkey; she had emerged triumphantly from the War, and
was therefore naturally inclined to demand her own terms. The Treaty
is not, at first sight, very alarming. The river Pruth was, as in 1812,
to form the boundary of the two empires, up to its confluence with
the Danube. From that point onwards, the left bank of the Danube
and all the islands, formed by the diff"erent branches of the river, were
assigned to Russia. The right bank was to remain Turkish ; but it was
to be demilitarised by the destruction of fortifications and the removal
of inhabitants ''to the distance of two hours from the river." Russian
warships were to enter the Danube, but not to proceed up it further
than its junction with the Pruth (Art. III). In Asia, the port of Poti
and some small extensions of territory were assigned to Russia, and
Turkey recognised the territorial cessions in the Peace between Russia
and Persia (February 22nd, 1828), (Art. IV). Freedom of trade in Turkey,
and free passage of Russian Black Sea merchantships through the
Bosphorus were granted, together with full freedom of trade and
navigation in the Black Sea (Art. VIII). By Article X, Turkey adhered
to the Treaty of London of July, 1827, and acceded to the Protocol
of March 22nd, 1829, thereby granting a dependent status to Greeceand conceding to her the boundaries of Arta and Volo. By Article V,
Moldavia and Wallachia were placed under the suzerainty of the Porte,
but were to possess an "independent national government," and their
**
prosperity" was to be "guaranteed" by Russia. A separate Act,
signed at the same time, prevented the Turkish Government from
interfering in Moldavia and Wallachia, and from erecting or retaining
fortifications "or establishments of Mussulmans on the left bank of
the Danube^. "
Finally, by Article VI of the Treaty, the Turks agreed
to fulfil the conditions of the Convention of Akkerman with respect
to Serbia, to restore "the six districts detached from Serbia, so as to
secure for ever the tranquillity and welfare of that faithful and devoted
nation." By a subsequent arrangement, Serbia, like Moldavia and
Wallachia, obtained the right to police herself and to maintain armed
forces. It is obvious that Russia's intention was not to annex territory
outright. Rather, she designed to render the invasion of Turkey from
the Russian side easy in future, and to turn the principalities of Serbia,
Greece, Moldavia and Wallachia into four satellites of the Russian sun.
Diebitsch, writing to the Russian War Minister on the day of the
signature of the Treaty, claimed that he had obtained the maximum
of the demands laid down as the basis of the Treaty, and that "all
Europe will certainly recognise therein an increase of the great power
of our beloved lord." Nesselrode rejoiced particularly that the Arta-
Volo boundary had been given to Greece "by that famous Article lo,
for which," he wrote to Diebitsch, "I kiss your hands and feet^."
The Tsar himself appears to have been satisfied with the Treaty^, and
it was almost universally favoured by Russian public opinion. Curiously
enough, the point which pleased the Russian Government most was
the final defeat of the Franco-British policy on the one hand, and of
the Austrian on the other. Nesselrode wrote that God had willed to
confound the British and the French, and had made Greece owe her
salvation to the Russian Tsar. The Tsar himself rejoiced over the discomfiture
of his Allies. It was, however, not true, as Metternich and
Wellington thought, that the Russians desired to put an end to the
Ottoman empire by this Treaty. A Committee of Russian Ministers,
summoned by the Tsar in the first week of September, had discussed
the question of peace terms, and had unanimously arrived at the
1 By a second Separate Act, providing principally for payment of indemnity,
the Turks were to demolish the fortress of Giurgevo, which they still held,
* Schiemann, Geschichte Russlands, ii. 363.
2 So far as Europe was concerned. He would, however, have been glad to
obtain Kars and Erzerum.
conclusion that the fall of the Turkish Empire would create more
problems than it solved. As a matter of fact, Russian Governmental
circles knew that they had narrowly escaped a great disaster by the
daring enterprise of their military commander. Diebitsch's Instructions,
and the peace terms which he obtained, aimed at securing the
desired result by other means. The Russian policy was one of
"
peaceful
poHtical and economic penetration." Moldavia and Wallachia were to
be directly, Serbia and Greece indirectly, under Russian protection
and influence. The Tsar was to be the guardian and protector of
Christians inside Turkey, and Russian commerce was to complete the
peaceful conquest of the Ottoman empire. When these influences had
thoroughly asserted themselves, it would be time to think of a real
dismemberment of Turkey. For the moment, the "sick man" was
to be treated by auto-suggestion, not to be subjected to crude surgical
operations.
Wellington has often been criticised for his conduct of aff^airs during
this period. It was certainly unfortunate. He had tried to prevent
Canning from signing the July Treaty of 1827, to prevent the French
from entering the Morea in 1828, to prevent the Protocol of March,
1829, from becoming (as it did become) an ultimatum, to prevent
Russia from annexing the port of Poti, to confine the Greeks to the
Morea and the islands—and in every case without success. No man
has condemned his policy more distinctly than he did himself. Even
on August 25th, 1829, ^^ wrote to Aberdeen : "We are certainly in a bad
way We have made the greatest sacrifices of opinions, principles
and national pride and prejudice to our Allies. In return, they have
not performed their promises." And the climax of all this was reached
by the Adrianople Treaty. On October 4th, he wrote: "I am not
quite certain that what will exist will not be worse than the immediate
annihilation of the Turkish Power." His greatest mistake, however,
was to attempt to make Greece as small and weak as possible—a
mistake exaggerated by Aberdeen, who wished to divide Greece into
two parts. The underlying idea was that Greece must in any event fall
under Russian influence, and should therefore be made helpless. He
continued this policy to the end and succeeded by the Protocol of
February 3rd, 1830, in reducing the boundaries of Greece once more
to Thermopylae on the one side and the mouth of the Aspropotamos
on the other. Now, however, to counteract the Russians, he agreed to
Greece being declared independent of the Porte and to her being ruled
by a hereditary Sovereign. But these half-measures no longer satisfied
anybody. The French had turned Ibrahim out of the Morea; the
Russians had freed Moldavia, Wallachia and Serbia from Turkish
tyranny and advocated a v^ide extension of boundaries to Greece.
What had Great Britain done? Popular feeling v^as expressed in the
bitter taunt of Lady Canning^.
" Go to the North, and hear the terms
of bitterness and contempt in which England is assailed by the Russian
Government for our vacillation, by the Russian people for our illiberality....
Turkey complains of being betrayed. Greece considers us her
enemy." Certainly, whatever be the judgment passed, Great Britain's
position was a humiliating one, if contrasted with that to which Canning
had raised her.
The unpopularity of the Ministry was not primarily due to the
failure in foreign policy ; but was much increased by it. On November
15th, 1830, the Government fell, without any hand being stretched out
to save it, and the new King William IV sent for Lord Grey, who
handed the seals of the Foreign Office to Palmerston.
Лависс и Рамбо, "История XIX века" в 8 томах, изд. ОГИЗ, 1938 год, том 3, стр. 200 о позиции Франции:
Чарльз Файф:
Ч. А. ФАЙФЪ,
Членъ Академіи , Вице - ПрезидентъЛондонскаго Королевскаго
Историческаго Общества .
ИСТОРІЯ ЕВРОПЫ
ХІХ ВЪКА.
томъ II .
Съ 1814 по 1848 г.
ПЕРЕВОДЪ СЪ АНГЛІЙСКАГО
М. В. ЛУЧИЦКОй .
Подъ редакціей проф . И. В. Лучицкаго .
Москв А.
Типографія В. Ө . Рихтеръ , Тверская , домъ Талалаевой .
1889 .
Со стороны русскаго царя было бы неразсчетливо про-
должать враждебныя дѣйствія и такимъ образомъ дать пищу подо-
зрѣніямъ , начинавшимъ возникать въ Англіи , и вызвать нападеніе
со стороны Австріи . Хотя Карлъ Х и французскій кабинетъ , воз-
вращаясь къ тильзитскимъ идеямъ , предложили раздѣлъ Оттоманской
имперіи и всеобщую передѣлку карты Европы , причемъ Пфальцъ и
Бельгія отошли бы къ Франціи , но планъ этотъ былъ составленъ
слишкомъ поздно , чтобы привесть къ какимъ - нибудь послѣдствіямъ ' .
При европейской войнѣ Россія рисковала потерять все и ничего не
выиграть . Она заставила Турцію покориться и могла надѣяться на
сохраненіе въ теченіе послѣдующихъ годовъ своего преобладающаго
вліянія въ Константинополѣ , не прибѣгая къ какимъ - либо крупнымъ
территоріальнымъ перемѣнамъ , которые дали бы ея соперникамъ пред-
логъ для вмѣшательства въ интересахъ султана . Русскій импера-
торъ съ значительною для себя выгодою и съ достоинствомъ осво-
бодился изъ опаснаго положенія . Получено было все , что могло быть
удержано безопасно , и 14 сентября въ Адріанополѣ былъ заключенъ
миръ .
Письмо Лорда Артура Веллингтона к эрлу Абердину по поводу Адрианопольского мира, заключающее в себе меморандум Веллингтона об Адрианопольском мире:
MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,
London, 11th October, 1829.
I enclose you a Memorandum which I wrote last night upon the Russo-Turkish affair, which contains my opinion upon the whole case.
Believe me, &c.,
WELLINGTON.
P2
[1472.] [1473.]
[ENCLOSURE.]
MEMORANDUM.-OBSERVATIONS ON THE TREATY OF
ADRIANOPLE.
London, 10th October, 1829.
When his Imperial Majesty made known to his Majesty his intention of making war upon the Ottoman Porte, upon grounds affecting solely his own interest, his Majesty's government deprecated the execution of that intention, of which they did not feel the necessity; and, in answer to the declaration of his Imperial Majesty that he did not intend to make conquests and did not aim at the destruction of the Ottoman empire, his Majesty's government asserted the right of his Majesty, as one of the Powers of Europe, to watch over the progress of the contest and to examine its results.
His Majesty's government likewise declared their opinion that the most complete success in the justest cause would not entitle the stronger party to demand from the weaker sacrifices which would affect its political existence, or would infringe upon that state of territorial possession upon which the general peace has rested; and that demands of indemnity and compensation might be carried to such an extent as to render compliance scarcely practicable without reducing the Ottoman Power to a degree of weakness which would deprive it of the character of an independent Power.
From the period at which his Imperial Majesty first proposed to the Sovereigns, parties to the Treaty of the 6th July, measures of coercion to enforce upon the Porte the execution of the Treaty of the 6th July, 1827, that is to say, the 25th December, 1827 (6th January, 1828), his Imperial Majesty has professed his adherence to that principle of that Treaty enforced by the Protocol of the 12th December, 1827, which declared the absence of all interested motives on the part of any of the contracting Powers. His Imperial Majesty then declared that the manifestation of the absence of interested views was not an abstract maxim of generosity, nor a vain desire of glory on the part of his Imperial Majesty, but the well-understood interest of the empire of Russia.
His Imperial Majesty having subsequently on the 14th (26th) February, 1828, considered it necessary to declare war on account of his own complaints of the Porte, again adopted the principle of the 5th article of the Treaty of the 6th July and of the Protocol of the 12th December as the guide of his conduct. He then declared that Russia would act without the desire of making conquests; that she would not renounce, in any manner, those useful principles of moderation which characterise her political system.
The same principle was again laid down in the despatch from Count Nesselrode to Prince Lieven of the 17th (29th) April, 1828, and the declaration therein made that no intention exists of demanding indemnities which could affect the political existance of the Ottoman empire; and it was over again declared that the well-understood interests of Russia excluded the idea of overthrowing the Turkish empire.
The same moderate views were again professed in the declaration of war and in the letter from Count Nesselrode to the Grand Vizir of the same date; and even up to the last moment, as late as the his Imperial Majesty's government declared that he would not take advantage of the circumstances in which the events of the war had placed him to require from the Ottoman Porte terms which he would not have required under other events.
Let us now examine how far the Treaty of Peace is in conformity with the professions of moderation and promises made. The Sultan having lost his army, having ordered the remaining Asiatic troops to retire to their homes, threw himself upon the mercy of his Imperial Majesty at the suggestion of the ambassadors of his Britannic Majesty and the King of France, and of the minister extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the King of Prussia, by each and all of whom he was assured of his Imperial Majesty's justice and moderation. A Treaty and two Conventions were in consequence agreed to, which have left untouched no point affecting the interest, the strength, the dignity, or the independence of the Sultan, or his future security in relation to his Imperial Majesty.
The Treaty in respect to Greece is to be carried into execution in the manner the most onerous to the Sultan; and his claims for consideration are laid aside, contrary to the expectations held out by the Protocol of the Conferences of the three Powers
https://books.google...J&jtp=212#PA472
parties to the Treaty, of which the details are thus forced upon the Porte.
The stipulations of former Treaties in respect to the Servians are required to be carried into execution within fifteen days, with the addition of five districts to be ceded to that people, and the Russian army is to maintain its position in the neighbourhood of the capital till those stipulations will be carried into execution.
Wallachia and Moldavia are to be, in fact, independent of the Porte, excepting as far as regards the payment of tribute and the approbation and investiture of the Sovereign Prince elected for his life by each of the Principalities. But the Porte is deprived not only of its ancient rights of pre-emption for Constantinople and its arsenals, and for supplies for its fortresses on the Danube, but likewise of the means of exercising and enforcing those rights of suzeraineté which remain to that Power. Every Mahometan in the Principalities is to be withdrawn. The towns on the left bank of the Danube, and even the islands in the Danube, are to be evacuated by the Mahometans; their works are to be destroyed, including even Giurgevo, which is to be evacuated though now occupied by Turkish troops, and its works destroyed within fifteen days and before the Russian army will quit the neighbourhood of Constantinople.
Can it be believed that the Sultan can exercise an independent, or any control over the various people submitted to his government after such concessions have been extorted from him?
Will he not be dependent for the enforcement of tribute from the Princes of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Servia, upon the good will of the Emperor of Russia, as he will for the enforcement of tribute upon the Greek Prince, upon the good will of the Powers who will guarantee the execution of the Treaty to be framed under the provisions of the Treaty of the 6th July?
But let us look further into the Treaty. Let the seventh article be compared with the Treaty of Commerce of 1783, which it confirms, and with the stipulations of the Treaty of Akermann.
This article, after saying that the commerce of Russian subjects within the dominions of the Porte ne pourra être gêné dans aucun cas, ni sous aucun prétexte, par une prohibition ou une restriction quelconque, ni par suite d'aucun réglement ou mesure, soit d'administration, soit de législation intérieure, goes on to stipulate that Russian subjects, their vessels and merchandise, shall be exempt from all violence or captious (chicane) interference.
The first are to be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the minister and consuls of Russia; Russian vessels are to be subject to no visitation by Ottoman authorities, whether at sea or in Ottoman ports; and all produce or merchandise belonging to a Russian subject, after having paid the duties of customs, may be freely sold, deposited in magazinę or store, or transhipped to another vessel of any nation, without giving notice to any local authority, and still less without the necessity of having their license.
It must be observed that the breach of any of the stipulations of the 7th article of the Treaty is to be considered an act of hostility, and justifying reprisals on the part of the Emperor of Russia.
Will anybody believe, after reading this article, that that Power upon which it is imposed can be considered independent within its own territories? Here is a positive stipulation that hostilities are to be commenced if there should be any visitation of a Russian ship in any Turkish port; which Russian ship, it must be observed, must be liable to be visited as well to ascertain that it is not a ship of war, as, if a merchantman, to ascertain the nature and value of the cargo, and the amount of duty to be x claimed under the Treaty of Commerce.
Let us, then, see how far this empire is in a state of security to enable it to exercise any act of independent sovereignty, whether towards its own subjects, or foreign nations, or Russia.
It has been already shown how the Porte will stand in relation to its dependencies. The moral effect upon these dependencies, of all these stipulations, must not be lost sight of; but they are now considered principally in relation to the subjects of the Porte and to foreign countries, and particularly to Russia.
The Sultan has been required to pay a contribution amounting to 5,750,000l.; of which 250,000l. must be paid before the Russian army quits its positions in the neighbourhood of Constantinople; 500,000l. before the Russian army will repass to the northward of Mount Hæmus; and 750,000l. before the Russian army will cross the Danube. It is stipulated that these payments are to be made in a year from the period of the ratifications of the Treaty, and the further payments at the rate of
500,000l. a year in ten years; and that till those payments will be made the Emperor of Russia is to keep possession of Silistria and of the Principalities; and that, after the evacuation of the Principalities by the Russian troops at the end of eleven years, their Princes are to pay no tribute to the Porte for two years; making in the whole thirteen years during which the Porte can receive no tribute from the Principalities, in addition to a year and a half elapsed since the commencement of the war.
In the mean time the Emperor of Russia is for six months to remain in possession of Roumelia, for a year of Bulgaria, and for eleven years of the Principalities and of Silistria.
Then upon the Asiatic frontier General Paskewitch is to remain in his position for eight months. But when he shall evacuate the territory to be ceded to the Porte, the Russian armies will be in a position to be able to commence hostilities when they please in the very heart of Asia Minor, with the advantage of all their forces in Asia being concentrated and of all their communications with Tiflis, as well as those by sea, being secure.
On the other hand, let the advantage of their position upon the Danube be considered.
If a vessel should be visited, if a Russian subject should be questioned, or any subject of difference between Russia and the Porte should arise, those who have contemplated with dismay the rapid success of the campaign of 1829 must see that the Emperor will for ten years hold in his hands all the advantages which he has enjoyed since the end of the month of July last. Yet in less than one month from that time the Ottoman Porte has been constrained to sign the Treaty of Peace. It is true that after a year the Porte will regain possession of Varna and of other places in Roumelia and Bulgaria, that is to say, of the ground on which these places stood. But of what use will those positions be to the Porte? The Sultan will not have a shilling to expend upon the reconstruction of their works, upon supplying those works with means of defence, with ammunition, provisions, or garrisons.
The Porte, then, will remain for eleven years in the helpless state in which that government has been placed for the last six weeks, and nobody can pretend that that state is one of independence in its relation with Russia, which can afford to other Powers any security that the positions and resources of the Ottoman Porte will not be used by Russia for the purposes of
aggrandisement, to the injury of the other Powers of
The occupation of the territories in Asia can be understood. Their possession is connected with schemes of ambition in Asia, which Russia may reasonably entertain. But of what use is the possession of the Principalities on the Danube? The pretence for keeping possession of those provinces and of Silistria is that it is security for the payment of the contribution. But of what value is a contribution payable in ten years? What would now be the amount of the discount upon prompt payment upon the hypothesis that the Porte could pay at all? What will be the expense of keeping and governing those Principalities over and above the receipt of the tribute due to the Porte which during the ten years' occupation will reach the Imperial treasury?
If all these expenses be fairly calculated it will be found that the contribution will be vastly reduced, if any should remain, and that just grounds of suspicion are afforded that the Principalities are kept in order to facilitate ulterior views upon the independence of the Porte and the integrity of the Turkish dominions.
These views are quite inconsistent with the Emperor's professions and promises, and with the security of other Powers; most particularly of Austria, to whom the occupation of the Principalities for eleven years, after the professions made, are not only a serious injury but an insult. This injury and insult are aggravated by the prospect, afforded by recent transactions and by this peace, that the Ottoman Power must crumble to pieces, and that the Principalities must remain in the hands of Russia, and with them and with Silistria alone, the command of the navigation of the Danube and of the Black Sea.
These are the considerations arising out of recent transactions and the Treaty of Peace.
In discussing the effects of this Treaty of Peace I see that I have omitted to state the influence which it is calculated to give to the Emperor of Russia over the Christian subjects of the Porte of all denominations.
The whole of Armenia, Persian as well as Turkish, is now the dominion of his Imperial Majesty. The Servians, Wallachians, Moldavians, Greeks of the Morea, and the Islands, &c., will have been delivered from the Turkish domination; and it cannot be doubted that the measures completed by this Treaty of Peace must encourage other nations of Christians to endeavour to attain the same advantages by similar means.
The other Powers of Europe and all parties in Europe must view this Treaty of Peace in the same light as we do. They may not have such reasons as we have to look with jealousy and anxiety at its consequences; but they must all consider it in the same light as the deathblow to the independence of the Ottoman Porte, and the forerunner of the dissolution and extinction of its power.
Some may look to advantage from the partition of the spoil, as France and possibly Austria; others may consider the general war, which will be the consequence of the dissolution of the Turkish empire, as affording a chance of new combinations and a fresh partition of territory, as the Liberal party in France and elsewhere, and possibly Prussia. But the attention, the hopes, and expectations of all will be excited, and there is no chance of any Power disarming.
There is no doubt that it would have been more fortunate and better for the world if the Treaty of Peace had not been signed, and if the Russians had entered Constantinople, and if the Turkish empire had been dissolved.
The natural course would then have been for the great Powers of Europe to concur in discussing the disposition to be made of the wreck of the Turkish monarchy, including those important parts of it which the Emperor of Russia has taken to himself. It is difficult now to have such a discussion.
If France or Prussia were disposed to take any steps in concert with this country to prevent the evils which must be the consequence of this Treaty of Peace, they would before this time have approached us. France will not move with England and Austria without Prussia, and Prussia will not move without being certain that the movement will be agreeable to the Emperor of Russia.
The object of our measures, whatever they are, should be to obtain an engagement, or at all events a clear understanding among the five Powers, that in case of the dissolution of the Turkish monarchy the disposition of the dominions hitherto under its government should be concerted and determined upon by the five Powers in Conference. It is obvious that in the existing state of the Turkish Power such an agreement cannot form the subject of a treaty or convention. The hypothesis on
which such agreement would be founded would cause the evil immediately, against the consequences of which it would be intended eventually to guard.
The object must be approached then by another mode, probably a guarantee with an engagement between the Powers that they will consider as a subject for general discussion and concert any measures to be hereafter taken respecting the Turkish empire.
I am aware of the objections to a guarantee, particularly in this country and as applied to a country which, as in this case, we have not defended and have allowed to be conquered and overturned. But a concert growing out of a guarantee appears to me the measure the best calculated as well to calm the anxiety, the fears, and expectations which must be the result of this transaction as to satisfy this country that the best that could be done has been done for its interests.
This measure, however, will not prevent the necessity for our making a remonstrance to the Emperor upon what has passed.
This remonstrance, strong in facts yet moderate and respectful in language, should be so drawn as to be producible if necessary; but it should not be produced or ever come to light if we should be able to attain our object, that of obtaining a concert upon the future fate of the Turkish dominions. It might lead to this desired concert by drawing from the Emperor a proposition that it should take place; or by inducing other Powers to propose it upon seeing the statement of our opinion upon what has passed and our views of the future.
If a concert should take place, our answer to the public would be that we are assured that the crumbling to pieces of the Turkish government would not create a war, and would not occasion such an accession of dominion and power to any State as would alter the general balance of possession and give reasonable cause of apprehension to others.
WELLINGTON.
https://books.google...tput=text#c_top
Ответ эрла Абердина Лорду Веллингтону по тому же поводу:
The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington. MY DEAR DUKE, Foreign Office, 13th October, 1829. After a hard fight I have succeeded in carrying the Declaration as you proposed it. I enclose the paper which, it is understood, shall be inserted in the Protocol exactly as it stands, if we continue to insist upon it; at the same time, the words proposed in the margin are strongly urged by the Russian plenipotentiaries as necessary to their justification; I mean their personal justification, in making such a declaration. Upon my continued refusal to admit of any alteration, they requested me to take the proposal into consideration, with the most pressing entreaty that, if possible, we should agree to it. I promised to do this, and to let them know the result at our next meeting. It is, therefore, entirely in your hands, and whatever you decide will be perfectly satisfactory to me. Indeed, upon this, or upon any other matter, I beg you, once for all, to be persuaded that it is impossible for me to dissent from any decision to which you may come deliberately and dispassionately.
The rest of the business went on more smoothly. I was under the necessity of giving way about Eubea; and they agreed to carry the line of frontier to Missolonghi, close to the north side of the gulf, giving up to the Turks a considerable portion of what, on the map, I had proposed to assign to Greece. Of course we had a good deal of contention about this; and seeing that the sacrifices of territory were real, and that the inducement held out to us, by the promise of a Prince, might possibly not be performed, I determined to secure this at the same time. I gradually, therefore, named Prince Philip, with the condition that the sovereignty should be proposed to him in the same Protocol which settled the rest of the affair. I am happy to say that this was agreed to by them.
I also stipulated to retain on the Protocol the power of considering the value of the Turkish objections to the Protocol of the 22nd of March, in case the Porte should refuse our alternative; but it was perfectly understood between ourselves that the alternative should be offered, and sincerely supported, in the hope of being accepted.
No objection was made to the title of Prince Sovereign. As the question of a guarantee of the new State did not admit of an immediate decision, I proposed that we should merely refer to the article in the Treaty upon this subject, and declare that the Powers would make it the subject of future consideration and arrangement. I was the rather induced to do this from thinking that possibly the measure might be made useful in promoting a general arrangement of this nature. It seems reasonable that if Greece should be guaranteed against the Porte, there should be an equal guarantee of the Porte against the Greeks. As Greece will be made an independent State, will it be impossible to bring them both under the general European guarantee established at Vienna?
In discussing constitutions and charters, they offered to enter into some agreement to assist in suppressing anything of a democratic tendency; but I thought this too strong, and declined it.
Instead of having Turkish and Greek Commissioners to be parties in establishing the precise limits on the spot, which would only be a degradation to the Turks, and lead to some quarrel, I proposed that in the Protocol we should appoint our Residents, or other Commissioners, of the three Powers for the purpose of verifying the line described from the map; and that when done they should officially notify the result to the Porte and to the Greeks. This was also agreed to.
It is, of course, understood that immediately after my producing the accession of the Porte, the armistice is to be declared. If the Turks of Eubœa should be compelled to quit the island, in which the Greeks are not more numerous than five to one, there will be plenty of room for them in that district between the Gulf of Arta and the Gulf of Lepanto, now in possession of the Greeks.
I do not recollect anything more which it is material to mention. Lieven was throughout obstinate and stupid; Matuscewitz appeared to take everything upon himself.
I have this evening received M. de Laval. I am sorry to say that I do not at all like him, and do not very well understand him. He made some foolish observations upon the affairs of the East, as if he knew, or had heard very little about the matter; but he evidently wished to avoid much discussion; and after some commonplace talk, we fixed a meeting for the day after to-morrow. M. Roth was present. He will make his visit to Lieven to-morrow.
Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,
[ENCLOSURE.]
ABERDEEN.
https://books.google...tput=text#c_top
Британский посол (им был сэр Роберт Гордон) в Константинополе содействовал тому, чтобы султан капитулировал перед Россией на предлагавшейся ей условиях. Англия и Франция декларировали, что они считают принципы России справедливыми, но в то же время они выражали решимость не допустить взятия русскими Константинополя. Из Пруссии в Константинополь был срочно прислан прусский генерал, барон Муффлинг (в роли прусского посла в Константинополе), который сильно содействовал заключению Адрианопольского мира. Также спешному заключению мира содействовала паника самих осман, которые были поражены страхом после быстрого марша армии Дибича к Адрианополю, полагая, что его войска многочисленны "как листья на деревьях", и насчитывали никак не менее 60 тысяч солдат (на самом деле силы Дибича были гораздо меньше), тогда как сами османы для обороны своей столицы могли собрать от силы 15 тысяч солдат:
https://books.google...uffling&f=false
Дибич перешёл Балканы с 40-тысячным войском, из которого уже через 10 дней после начала этого марша в госпитале оказалось 10 тысяч человек, а к моменты подхода к Адрианополю армия Дибича уже насчитывала всего-лишь 14 тысяч солдат и офицеров (но османы оценивали численность армии Дибича в Адрианополе в 60 или 70 тысяч солдат). А оборону Константинополя перед лицом наступавших русских заняли 20 тысяч османских солдат:
https://books.google...uffling&f=false
Дибич распространял слухи, что его армия в Адрианополе насчитывала 60 тысяч человек, хотя на самом деле он, несмотря на поступавшие к нему в Адрианополь пополнения, имел к концу августа 1829 года лишь 21 тысячу сабель и штыков. А чтобы припугнуть султана, Дибич предпринял авантюрную военную демонстрацию - марш своих войск к Константинополю и Боспору (в частности он занял городок Мидье (греч. Мидию)). В итоге султан был сломлен, и был вынужден согласиться на русские условия:
https://books.google...uffling&f=false
В Адрианополе Дибич имел лишь 18 тысяч селовек, готовых воевать - остальные были выведены из строя, но не из-за боёв, а дизентерией. За свой вклад в капитуляцию Турции, прусский генерал Муффлинг получил вторую по старшинству награду от русского царя:
https://books.google...uffling&f=false
Где-то читал, что австрияки и англичане (если не ошибаюсь) предлагали турецкому султану на выплату любой контрибуции - они ему помогут с выплатой - но только отказываться от территориальных уступок. На это султан ответил - если бы у меня были деньги, то я вообще не стал бы заключать мира, а продолжил бы войну, но казна пуста. Однако на продолжение войны те ему денег не стали ни обещать, ни тем более давать.
